Record number :
435813
Title of article :
Infinitely repeated games of reciprocal players
Author/Authors :
Yves Breitmoser، نويسنده ,
Issue Information :
روزنامه با شماره پیاپی سال 2005
Pages :
5
From page :
323
To page :
327
Abstract :
We analyze infinitely repeated games of two impatient and negatively reciprocal players. The assumed emotions allow for more straightforward rationalizations of retaliations than the Folk theorems under discounting. The model we propose implies case-dependent retaliations and can be generalized to incorporate positive reciprocity (e.g. apologies and love).
Keywords :
Other-regarding behavior , Repeated games
Journal title :
Economics Letters
Journal title :
Economics Letters
Serial Year :
2005
Link To Document :
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